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Abstract:
This paper presents a meta-analysis of dream theory within psychology and neuroscience.
The questions it attempts to answer are: what is the neuroscientific basis of dreaming? Why do
dreams exist (do they have an adaptive function)? Could dreams possibly have no function? And,
what is the best way to interpret a dream? The current analysis presents various theories relevant
to each of these questions and compares their viability. It also briefly examines the origins of
psychological thought on dreams and, towards the end, outlines the steps and empirical support
for a well-regarded method of dream interpretation known as the cognitive experiential model. In
the end, the analysis finds that a major likely cause of dreaming is the occurrence of different
memory processes during REM sleep, whose activity likely also contributes to dream content. As
for adaptive functions, the existing neuroscientific evidence suggests that we are almost certainly
capable of learning during dreams and that learning may therefore be one of dreams’ primary
adaptive functions. However, due to the scarcity of research on dreams, few of these conclusions
can be drawn with overwhelming confidence. Lastly, in regards to dream interpretation, the
cognitive experiential model seems to provides a framework for dream interpretation which
clients and therapists alike find satisfying and useful.
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Introduction
Dreams are undeniably mystifying events. Just think of the reality that every night, each
one of us seemingly goes unconscious only to suddenly hallucinate astonishingly fantastical
events that despite our best selves we often believe in the moment are truly real! Naturally, the
profound feelings inspired by dreams have led ancient civilizations to view dreams as events of
spiritual and religious significance (Crisp, n.d.). Even in the modern age, many individuals see
dreams as capable of having spiritual significance, although this perspecive tends to be pushed
by society less and less. In the last hundred years, however, humans have invented the field of
psychology, whose sole intent is to investigate the phenomena of the human mind. Given that
such a discipline exists, one might naturally wonder about the scientific perspective on the
mystical events we call dreams. The present paper offers an in-depth psychological and
neuroscientific overview of the existing literature on dreams in an attempt to provide that
perspective. What are dreams? Why do they sometimes feel so significant? And, how can I
reliablyinterpret my dreams to derive meaningful conclusions from them? The present paper
tackles all of these questions in the hopes of providing a satisfactory view of the current state of
dream science.
The first major theoretical perspective on dream functions came from Sigmund Freud in
the year 1900. Forty years later, Carl Jung contributed a theory which significantly departed from
Freud’s views. But since then, no single theory has dominated psychological thought on the
subject. The field of study of dream function may also be described as rather nascent compared
to other topics in psychology. Nevertheless, a number of functional theories do exist on dreams.
Furthermore, recent advances in neuroimaging technology have spurred a number of
neurologically based theories on the causes of dreams. These findings have in turn been used to
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strengthen and discredit previously proposed theories. In the end, one might say that dream
research is currently in the midst of a steep learning phase. In the ensuing analysis, I will
illuminate some of the major theories of dreams that have withstood the onslaught of recent
neuroscientific evidence or significantly impacted the discussion about dreams. I will also briefly
pay homage to the origins of dream theory through a distillation of Freud and Jung’s theories on
dreaming, some of which stand strong in the face of recent neuroscientific evidence. Finally, I
close out the discussion by outlining an empirically tested method which can be used to interpret
one’s dreams.
Dream Theories
Freud
The first psychologist to make a major attempt at deciphering the meaning and
psychological function of dreams was Sigmund Freud. In honor of Freud’s contributions to the
world of psychology, I will briefly mention Freud’s major points on the psychological function
of dreams. In short, Freud believed that dream content was partially comprised of imagery which
symbolically represented an individual’s unconscious desires or wishes. He referred to this
component of his dream theory as “wish-fulfillment” (Domhoff, 2009). Freud further believed
that these wishes were often primitive bodily desires for raw actions like sex and violence
(Domhoff, 2009). Another major component of Freud’s beliefs on dreams is that the visuals we
see in dreams are not only symbolically representative of “body-based” desire, but that the
symbolic or obscured representation of these desires served another role. Because of the
shocking and primitive nature of these body-based desires, Freud believed dreams obscure their
depiction to prevent the dreamer from awakening in shock mid-sleep and thus disrupting the
sleep process (Hoss, 2013). These two points consitute Freud’s most important claims on the
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function of dreams. Thus, in short, Freud believed that dreams represent unconscious bodily
wishes of the dreamer, and that this content is intentionally obscured by the mind to preserve the
process of sleep. This obscurity, in turn, causes the unusual fantasy-like visual aspects of dreams.
Owing as we are to Sigmund Freud for helping establish psychology as a legitimate field
of scientific study, our duty nevertheless requires us to examine all proposed theories with a
critical eye. Under a critical evaluation based on research conducted after Freud’s time, Freud’s
assertions appear scantly supported. Although researchers agree that dream content is
consistently strange or obscure in appearance and that dreams generally carry a sense of personal
psychological meaning to the dreamer, little to no research supports either the idea that dream
imagery embodies subconscious bodily desires, or that the obscure nature of the dream content is
designed to protect dreamers from “too directly” observing their subconscious desires and
waking up due to shock, thus disturbing the sleep cycle (Hoss, 2013; Wamsley & Stickgold,
2010). Certain evidence even seems to outright refute the claim that dream imagery is always of
an obscure symbolic nature, such as the observation by Wamsley and Stickgold (2010) that
contrary to dreams as an obscure and symbolic language, dreams are “transparently centered on
people, activities, and ideas experienced in daily life” (Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010). Thus,
Freud’s views on dreams remain, in light of recent research, tenuous at best.
Jung
Another major historical perspective on dreams worthy of consideration comes from Carl
Jung. Jung, whose conception of dreams is perhaps more well-known than Freud’s, proposes that
dreams help balance the misconceptions created by the ego in waking life and that in doing so,
they integrate the conscious mind with the unconscious mind and, in a sense, perform a
“maintenance of the self” (Hoss 2013). According to Jung, our unconscious mind recognizes
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misconceptions in our ego by identifying responses in waking life which are novel or produce
strong negative emotion: these situations become candidates for possible misconceptions
generated by the ego (Hoss, 2013). These situations are then reproduced within our dreams,
wherein the dreamer, who is often urged on by a guide which represents the unconscious mind,
tests out different reactions to the scenario in an attempt to find a more positive resolution. In this
way, Jung claims that dreams “restore our psychological balance” by “compensating” for
misconceptions in the ego in order to “bring our awareness back to reality, and warn of dangers
of our present course” (Hoss, 2013). Jung describes this function of dreams as“transcendent” and
concludes that dreams “bring about. . . a new awareness and a more integrated personality”
(Hoss 2013). This view has come to be known as the compensatory theory of dreams.
Several pieces of evidence from modern dream research actually support many of the
functions proposed by Jung’s compensatory view. In a sense, Jung’s theory can be construed as
one of the many learning theories of dreams. While these theories will be discussed in more
detail in the proceeding sections, in short, this group of theories claim that dreams new
information or skills through dream events such as such as rehearsing specific tasks, creative
problem solving, practicing basic survival mechanisms, and practicing social skills, among other
things (McNamara and Butler, 2009; Ribeiro, 2014; Hoss, 2013; Wagner, U., Gals, S., Haider,
H., Verleger, R., Born, J., 2004). In this context, Jung’s compensatory view may be seen as
learning better ways to approach the situations in which one’s ego has created a potential
misconception, whether it involves a belief related to other humans or some other aspect of the
natural world. Furthermore, extensive neurological research of brain activity during REM dream
states seems to support various learning theories of dreaming (Hoss, 2013; Wamsley, 2014;
Wamsley & Stickgold, 2013). This means that Jung’s compensatory view on dreams may be
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tenable within the current landscape of psychological dream research (a surprising and exciting
conclusion given the lack of neuroscientific knowledge available during the time when Jung
proposed the theories).
Theories of Learning
A large number of the modern theories on dreaming view dreams as learning tools. Thus,
for the sake of simplicity, I haved group these theories together under an umbrella which I call
“theories of learning.” It should be noted, however, that the authors themselves do not all
describe their findings in these explicit terms.
The first major theory of learning is threat simulation theory. One of the strongest
arguments for this theory comes from neurobiologist Sidarta Ribeiro. In a unique approach to
dream theory, Ribeiro (2004) attempts to shed light on the mystery of dream function by tackling
the phenomenon from an evolutionary perspective. Ribeiro believes that a complete answer to
the mystery of dream function will never be found without an analysis that incorporates the
theory of evolution. As such, in his 2004 paper, Ribeiro makes a significant contribution to the
work of dream function analysis by tracing the evolutionary history of dreaming. This approach
inevitably led Ribeiro to trace not only the trait of dreaming, but also instances of the sleep state
most strongly associated with dreaming, namely, the sleep state known as rapid-eye-movement,
or REM, sleep (Ribeiro, 2004; Hoss, 2013; Wamsley, 2014; McNamara and Butler, 2009).
In sleep research, researchers have divided sleep into at least three different categories or
stages during which the brain emits identifiably distinct wavelengths of energy (Ribeiro, 2004).
Among these phases, REM sleep, which is also the deepest phase of sleep, is particularly
distinctive due to its accompanying phenomenon which gives the sleep state its name: during
REM sleep, activation of certain parts of the brain cause the eyes to rapidly move back and forth
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while the eyelids are still shut (McNamara and Butler, 2009). Other distinctive aspects of REM
sleep include greater cerebral activity compared to other sleep states and near-paralysis of our
motor capabilities (Ribeiro, 2004; McNamara and Butler, 2009). During REM, we also have
more intense and memorable dreams. In a review of REM and non-REM (NREM) dream reports,
McNamara and Butler (2009) found that dreams experienced during REM are reported as longer,
more emotional, and more visually vivid than non-REM state dreams. Convergent findings from
other studies further suggest that REM dreams are the ones which exhibit the “strangeness” and
obscurity which we typically associate with dreaming (Ribeiro, 2004; Domhoff, 2017). In other
words, our most memorable and fantastical dreams seem to occur exclusively during REM sleep.
Given this demonstrated association, many researchers, including Ribeiro (2004), have
attempted to understand the mystifying phenomenon of dreams by studying REM from various
angles of interpretation. Returning to the paper at hand, Ribeiro (2004) begins his exploration of
dreams by considering the evolution of REM sleep. REM sleep first appeared in various species
of birds, whose most intelligent relatives, the reptiles, had only reached slow-wave sleep, the
stage just one level below REM sleep in terms of depth (Ribeiro, 2004). After appearing in birds,
a more developed version of REM sleep presented itself within marsupials. Finally, the most
developed version of REM sleep appeared in terrestrial mammals and eventually in humans
(Ribeiro, 2004). A brief comparison between human and animal REM sleep may help explain
how REM in one species can be “more developed” than in another. In an ideal night’s sleep,
humans repeat a cycle of four stages of sleep approximately three to five times, depending on
how long one stays asleep. Each stage in the cycle indicates a deeper level of sleep, with REM
being the deepest, and in each repetition of the cycle, the stage of REM sleep lasts longer than in
previous cycles; the length of REM therefore varies in duration from as short as ten minutes in
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the first occurrence to longer than thirty minutes in subsequent occurrences during a given
night’s sleep (Ribeiro, 2004). Ribeiro’s description of one species’ REM sleep being “more
developed” than another species’ thus directly refers to the quantifiable measurements of the
number of times REM sleep occurs within a single night’s sleep and how long these stages last
(Ribeiro, 2004). Ultimately, the main conclusion is that humans have achieved the most
developed form of REM sleep among all species who exhibit REM sleep,
Such a quantifiably sequential development of the particular trait of REM sleep begs the
question of why birds developed REM sleep while reptiles did not, and why subsequent species
developed more intense versions of REM than the birds. The best way to answer this question is
to examine the benefits that REM provides to an organism compared to less deep levels of sleep.
A substantial amount of research exists on the topic of the functions of REM sleep: by far, the
most common recurring finding is that REM sleep likely plays an integral role in the processing
of memories (McNamara and Butler, 2009; Schredl, 2017; Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010;
Wamsley, 2014; Hoss, 2013). Specifically, Ribeiro (2004) states that during the REM stage of
sleep, there is intense “non-stationary memory reverberation,” or in other words, during REM
sleep there is an increased amount of neuronal activity across many distant regions of the brain,
but regions related to memory show especially heightened activity (Ribeiro, 2004). Ribeiro
further states that these activated memories are in part responsible for the content which
comprises dreams, and that the high levels of excitation during REM accounts for our bright and
vivid perceptions of dreams (Ribeiro 2004). Evidence of mental activity during slow-wave sleep,
the stage just before REM, further supports this claim. Studies on slow-wave sleep dreams have
shown that these dreams possess less intense or vivid imagery, is more “ordinary” in nature, and
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often includes realistic replications of activities completed during the day (Ribeiro, 2004;
McNamara and Butler, 2010; Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010).
From all of the above, Ribeiro’s final conclusion about the function of dreams is that they
seem to provide “probabilistic simulations of past events and future expectations;” within these
simulations, we test out novel behaviors, and ultimately, we learn from them (Ribeiro, 2004).
Thus, Ribeiro believes that dreams serve as tools for learning. This claim can be seen as a
general form of the threat simulation theory of dreaming, which claims that we use dreams to
simulate potential threats and test different potential reactions to those threats (Ribeiro, 2004).
The theory is supported by a significant amount of evidence. Firstly, it seems to account for two
established and highly relatable aspects of dreams, which is first, that dreams tend to carry more
negative emotions than positive emotions (one might interpret this as a disproportionate portrayal
of threating as opposed to felicitous situations, and that during these situations, individuals often
feel compelled to act in reaction to these threats, in a way similar to Ribeiro’s theory (McNamara
and Butler, 2009; Hoss, 2013; Domhoff, 2017). Secondly, the theory seems to account for the
various types of positive and negative dreams which do exist. For instance, the occurrence of
highly negative dreams or nightmares might be seen as didactic simulations which encourage
learning through negative reinforcement, whereas dreams about positive scenarios might foster
learning through positive reinforcement of adaptive behaviors such as finding food and mates
(Ribeiro, 2004). Though modern dreams tend to be centered on social conflict rather than lethal
conflicts, social conflicts may simply be the most important threats we encounter in the modern
world (Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010). One final piece of supportive evidence for dreams as
adaptive simulations comes from research on REM sleep in animals. Interestingly enough, in all
animal species that have been studied so far, REM sleep occurs more often in juveniles than in
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adults (Ribeiro, 2004). This finding could very well suggest that the memory activation which
occurs during REM sleep indeed evolved to help species learn from their past experiences
(Ribeiro, 2004).
McNamara and Butler (2009) propose a slightly different evolutionary theory of dreams.
In their paper, the two researchers offer an evolutionary perspective on dreams which is heavily
based on Ribeiro’s previous work, but which offers a novel and worthwhile insight culminating
in a unique conclusion. Namely, McNamara and Butler bring to light an aspect of evolutionary
dream phenomenology which Ribeiro largely ignores. This phenomenon is the bihemispheric
activation observed in REM sleep. McNamara and Butler stress that the bihemispheric activation
in REM sleep is a development worth examining in the evolution of REM sleep and dreams. The
researchers claim that this bihemispheric activation is a major source of the “mentation”
experiencd during sleep. This mentation inspired by bihemispheric activation thus constitutes our
experience of dreams (McNamara & Butler, 2009). So, why might have sleep evolved into a
bihemspheric rather than a unihemispheric event? Unfortunately, McNamara and Butler offer
less on this question than Ribeiro on his similar question. Nevertheless, one could infer that the
evolution of this trait reflects the greater capacity for intelligence within post-reptilian species.
Greater intelligence would entail a more abundant and complex process of memory consolidation
during sleep, thus resulting in the eventual development of bihemispheric communication duinrg
sleep states. Contrary to Ribeiro (2004), however, McNamara and Butler (2009) do not believe
that REM processes are a primary cause for the experience of dreaming. Their evidence for this
statement lies in the finding that young children do not seem to report dreams until they have
reached certain developmental stages despite experiencing REM sleep prior to those stages
(McNamara & Butler, 2009). The particular mental capacities necessary for dream reports are
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sufficient development within the visuospatial and cognitive areas of the brain. The researchers
claim these areas must be well-enough developed to support the narrative nature of dreams
(McNamara and Butler, 2009). The claim ultimately feels weak, however, due to the clear
possibility that young children may experience dreams but may not be scapable of reporting the
content of their dreams.
Despite this weak claim, McNamara and Butler (2009) do make a noteworthy conclusion
from their evolutionary overview. In essence, the researchers claim that the process of dreaming
costs too much energy to not have an adaptive function. And so, based on their finding that
dream content tends to focus heavily on social interactions, the researchers conclude that perhaps
dreams serve as simulation spaces in which to test potentially risky forms of social interactions.
The high value of social activity in primitive existence seems to support this theory. It has been
hypothesized that in primitive times, social belonging was a crucial aspect of not just happiness, ,
but of survival. This essentialness was due to the fact that humans originated as a tribal species
which survived through collaboration and teamwork in various arenas of life from hunting prey,
to planting crops, to violent altercations with other tribes. Therefore, dreams evolved as a method
of testing new types of human interactions which could have severe negative consequences if
attempted in real life (McNamara and Butler, 2009). The potential negative consequences of
these behaviors make them “costly” actions and the interactions themselves are social “signals;”
hence, McNamara and Butler (2009) dubbed their theory costly signaling theory. Therefore,
McNamara and Butler make, in a sense, the profound conclusion that dreams help promote social
cohesion within human societies (McNamara and Butler, 2009). Admittedly, costly signaling
theory does not differ drastically from Ribeiro (2004)’s threat simulation theory. However, it is
distinct in that it stresses more heavily the role of dreams in promoting social cohesion as
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opposed to lethal threats. As previously mentioned, this focus on social interactions seen in
modern dreams may reflect that negative social interactions are the biggest threats most
individuals in Western countries face on a regular basis.
A third and final theory of learning exists which differs more dramatically from threat
simulation. This final theory asserts that the primary function of dreams may be to produce
insight and offer the dreamer a unique state in which we can creatively solve problems we face
in waking life. It is well documented that sleeping can help improve performance on tasks which
measure semantic memory and procedural memory (Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Wamsley,
2014). While these findings are more about sleep in general than dreams specifically, one
question researchers have asked which is relevant to insight theory is what role, if any, do
dreams play in these memory enhancements? This question has proven difficult to answer due to
the difficulty of separating the effects of dreams from the effects of the sleep in which dreams
embed themselves (Domhoff, 2009; Domhoff, 2017). Few studies exist on this particular
question in dream research, likely due to the difficulty mentioned above.
While research is scarce, one study by Wagner and colleauges (2004) examines the role
of sleep, albeit not specifically dreams, in providing insight. The concept of insight is
distinguished from the more simplistic processes of semantic memory and procedural memory
rehearsal. Wagner and colleagues describe insight as “a mental restructuring that leads to a
sudden gain of explicit knowledge allowing qualitatively changed behavior” (Wagner, U., Gais,
S., Haider, H., Verleger, R., & Born, J., 2004). Although not specific to dreams, Wagner and
colleagues examined the power of sleep to produce insight in a unique experiment. The
researchers created a game wherein understanding the basic rules of the game was sufficient to
lead players to be successful. However, the researchers cleverly designed the game such that
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there existed a particular unorthodox tactic which if utilized led greater success than the
conventional method of play. Researchers divided participants into three groups: a waking group,
a daytime sleeping group, and a nocturnal sleeping group, where these distinctions described the
way in which participants rested after an initial learning session and practice session of the game.
Researchers then examined which participants managed to discover the hidden tactic within the
game, which represented gaining insight. Importantly, this tactic was meticulously created to
only be discoverable through creative insight and not through unthoughtful practice, thus
distinguishing it from the processes of semantic or procedural memory. The findings were that
participants who slept, whether in the daytime or during nocturnal sleep, were more than twice as
likely to discover the insight (Wagner et al., 2004). The researchers concluded from this that the
processes of sleep most likely promote insight and creative problem-solving within individuals
(Wagner et al., 2004).
Although the study did not focus on the particular role of dreams in insight, researchers
nevertheless did ask participants if they dreamt about the task in any way during the resting
period. But disappointingly, none of the participants reported having any dreams related to the
task (Wagner et al., 2004). This type of questionnaire represents one way researchers could
potentially distinguish between outcomes of dreams and outcomes of underlying sleep processes
(Domhoff, 2017; Domhoff, 2007). Another way researchers can distinguish between the two is
through the combined use of either fMRI or EEG scans and follow-up dream questionnaires
(Hoss, 2013; Dresler, M., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V. I., Koch, S. P., Holsboer, F., Steiger,
A., ... & Czisch, M., 2012). The expensive and cumbersome nature of these research tools
inevitably prevent numerous large-scale studies from being conducted, however. But,
nevertheless, perhaps a smaller-scale replication of Wagner and colleagues’ study which focused
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on dreams instead of sleep and incorporated these measures would yield enlightening results,
assuming the participants had dreams this time around.
Aside from Wagner and colleagues, few other studies exist exploring the specific
correlation of dreaming and insight. If we turn to anecdotal evidence, however, myriad famous
and ordinary individuals claim to have received important insight from their dreams. Dmitri
Mendeleev, the man who invented the periodic table of the elements, claimed that his idea for his
invention was revealed to him in a dream (Ribeiro, 2004); chemist Kekulé, who discovered the
strcture of benzene, claimed that the idea for the structure came to him in a dream in which he
watched a snake eating its own tail, which apparently resembled his subsequent discovery
(Ribeiro, 2004); Albert Einstein claimed that his idea for the theory of relativity was inspired by
a dream (Ribeiro, 2004). Aside from science, in the realm of art, both John Lennon and the
Beatles have claimed to have written songs based on lyrics or melodies witnessed inside a dream
(Gregoire, 2017), and in the realm of literature, renowned horror novelist Stephen King claims
that many of his stories have been inspired by vivid dreams (Gregoire, 2017). These testimonies
seem to suggest a clear ability for dreams to portray creative insights to problems as well as to
fuel artistic creativity and even directly create works of art. More research into the role of
creative problem-solving in dreams would therefore likely be fruitful, if done properly. This
topic may be particularly difficult to study, however, given the unpredictable nature of receiving
insight through dreams. Nevertheless, there would be little harm in attempting an experiment to
test for dream-induced insight, especially given the high probability of finding fruitful results.
To conclude, there are two major varieties of learning-oriented theories: realistic threat
simulation theories and insight/problem-solving theories. Theories based on threat simulation
seem to have more consistent empirical support than theories of insight, but this may be due in
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part to the difficulty of studying the process of insight within dreams. Furthermore, anecdotal
evidence suggests that dreams do possess the capability to provide unique creative insights, and
to fuel artistic creativity as well as to generate entire miniature works of art within the dream
state. Lastly, in terms of Freud and Jung, Freud’s theory of wish-fulfillment appears scantly
supported by modern evidence and even refuted by it in some cases. On the other hand, Jung’s
compensatory theory of dreams seems to be largely unscathed and even supported by
neurological findings.
Adaptive Functions from a Neuroscience Perspective
One of the great advances of modern psychological study is the introduction of
techniques which allow us to directly observes the neurological activity of the brain. No longer
must we rely on observation and inference to predict one’s psychological states; instead, an
increasing body of knowledge about the functions of particular brain regions allows us to make
inferences about one’s brain state, one’s subjective experiences, and one’s other internally
ocurring phenomena based on neurobiological information alone. While the previous section
incorporates some neurological evidence in its analysis of dream theories, the current section
delves more deeply into neuroscientific findings of dream phenomenology. Ultimately, I hope to
portray a clear picture of what is actually happening in the brain when we dream at a neuronal
level.
In “The Neuropsychology of Dreaming: Studies and Observations,” Robert Hoss
provides an extensive account of the neuroscientific findings on dreams and the implications of
this evidence for theories of dreaming. In a general overview of dream state brain activity, Hoss
argues that the dream state can be seen as “a state of generalized brain activity with the specific
exclusion of executive systems” (Hoss, 2013). Figure 1 in the appendix depicts a diagram of the
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active brain regions observed during REM sleep which represents an eggregation of information
from a breadth of neuroimaging studie. The active brain regions during REM sleep include, in
general terms: the visual association cortex (note: not the visual cortex, which is inactive), which
organizes imagery into a visual space; motor and sensory regions; the temporal areas used in
facial recognition, auditory processing, and episodic recall; association regions of the cortex,
which may account for the metaphorical nature of dream imagery; primal regions which regulate
sleep, consciousness, alertness, and metabolic function; the limbic region, involved in emotional
processing, especially in the amygdala and hypothalamus, both of which are active, as well as
short- to long-term memory consolidation; and finally, regions involved in emotional control,
fear extinction and reward-based adaptive action planning and learning functions (Hoss, 2013).
Based on these active regions, Hoss draws three major conclusions about the nature of
dreams. First, dreams seem to in a sense express the unconscious. Dreams have been considered
paths to the unconscious since as long as they have been studied. Freud famously noted that
dreams are the “royal road to the unconscious (Freud, 2013). Jung, too, similarly also described
dreams, claiming that they are “the most readily accessible expression of the unconscious” (Jung,
1971). Certain neurological evidence seems to support this idea the dreams depict the world from
the perspective of the unconscious. Particularly, areas which are associated with episodic
memory, working memory, and conscious reflection, such as the precuneus and the posterior
cingulate cortex, remain relatively inactive during REM sleep while various limbic regions and
the hippocampus, which are associated with emotions and memory consolidation, remain highly
active (Hoss, 2013). This pattern of activation suggests that while dreaming, we might have, in a
sense, “easy access” to the emotional aspects of memories but lack access to the specific episodic
nature of memories (Hoss, 2013). From this perspective, dreams may be able to project the
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emotional impact that various events have on us, while rarely, if ever, depicting those effects in
obvious ways. This interpretation would explain the common notion of “symbolic meaning”
many people sense in their dreams. Therefore, dreams may very well show us our unconscious
and suppressed emotions (Hoss, 2013; Hill & Knox, 2010).
The second major conclusion Hoss (2013) draws from neurological findings is that
dreams seem to operate in a highly associative way. Hoss (2013) notes that dream images are
like a picture-metaphor form of communication: while the images may not make immediate
sense, they are not meant to. Instead, they are symbolic, almost like each image is itself a word
or a phrase in a foreign language (Hoss 2013). Mostly, Hoss draws this claim from observing
activity in what he calls “the association cortex,” presumably a part of the brain which aids in the
creation of associations between concepts, as well as the inferior parietal cortex, which helps us
to create a meaningful perception of our visual space (Hoss, 2013). This conclusion inevitably
resonates with those of us who are capable of remembering our dreams.
Hoss’s third and final conclusion about the nature of dreams is that dreams picture
emotion. As most know from personal experience, dreams undeniably can be highly emotional
events. Evidence from brain imaging studies now supports this claim by revealing brain activity
in regions associated with emotional activation during the dream state. Most crucially, evidence
for this claim can be seen in the high activation of the limbic system, which is known to regulate
emotion, and the amygdala, which is known for being the house of negative emotions such as
fear, during REM sleep (Hoss, 2013).
A number of theories have been proposed which account for Hoss’ neurological findings.
One theory based on the idea that dreams express the unconscious has been proposed by Hobson
(2009), who asserts the theory of protoconsciousness. Under this theory, dreams may possess the
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adaptive function of encouraging conscious personal development during wakefulness by
encouraging individuals to self-reflect on their dreams, which depict meaningful unconscious
processes (Hoss, 2013). Another theory based on dreams’ pension for excessive association
comes from Zhang. Zhang asserts that the primary function of dreams is encoding, processing,
and transfer of data from temporary memory to long-term memory (Hoss, 2013). During this
process of memory consolidation, short-term memories are activated and “sent” to the conscious
part of the brain. Once there, these memories are then “self-maintained” by the dreamer’s
associative thinking system (Hoss, 2013). This theory, which Zhang calls the continualactivation theory accounts for the tendency of dreams to be both continuous and capricious in
their setting: a dream’s broader setting thus reflects a certain memory being activated, while the
strange and unpredictable mutations therein reflect the work of associative regions of the brain
“maintaining” the memory; the sudden shifting of dream setting, which commonly occurs in our
dreams, reflects the activation of a different memory (Hoss, 2013). Two final theories based on
dreams’ pension for depicting emotions come from Hartmann and Hoss. Hartmann subtly
expands the claim that dreams depict emotion by claiming not only that the central images of a
dream picture the emotions of the dreamer, but also that “the intensity of the image is a measure
of the strength of the emotion” (Hartmann, 1995). In a separate theory, Hoss comments on the
role of color in dream imagery. Based on previous findings that colors seem to invoke different
emotions in waking life, Hoss (2010) proposes that in a similar manner, the colors we perceive in
dreams symbolize the same emotions they have been shown to evoke in waking life.
A special note should be placed on the role of memory in REM dreams. As previously
mentioned, various neurological studies suggest that some form of memory activation,
consolidation, or trimming likely occurs during REM sleep (Hoss, 2013; McNamara & Butler,
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2009; Domhoff, 2009; Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010; Wamsley, 2014). The following findings
illustrate the strength of this evidence for a role of memory in REM sleep processes: Zhang
proposes that the main function of dreaming is the processing, encoding, and transfer of shortterm memories to long-term memories; Tarnow (2003) has found evidence to suggest that
dreams strengthen consolidation of semantic memories, or memories related to the meaning of
information; Payne and Nadal (2004) have made a similar finding, which is that dreams help
strengthen semantic memories and consolidate them into a smooth narrative; finally, Hoss’s
aggregated list of active brain regions reveal high activity in regions commonly associated with
memory processing, such as regions within the limbic system, including the hippocampus and
amygdala (Hoss, 2013). Suffice it to say, there is convincing evidence that memory processes
occur during REM sleep. These processes, in turn, likely influence the content which we
perceive and feel emotionally during dreams.
Neuroscientific Evidence For and Against Theories of Learning
A significant amount of brain imaging data exists on the state of dreaming. If we are to
abide by a conservative view of empirical validity, perhaps we might wish to see brain imaging
studies as limitations of what is neurologically or psychologically possible within dreams, or at
least of indicators of what is likely to be possible. In this very frame of mind, Hoss (2013) offers
a succinct analysis of what is possible within the phenomenon of dreams based on
neuroscientific findings of REM sleep brain activity. Beore summarizing Hoss’s findings, a
moment ‘ought to be taken to acknowledge the extensive research which Hoss (2013) conducted
in order to produce the article upon which the present paper quite consistently relies. If it were
not for Hoss’s work, a large portion of the present paper would have been far more difficult to
successfully and rigorously produce.
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To test learning theories of dreaming, Hoss (2013) assessed five questions which lie at
the heart of a common attempt at explaining how we can learn from dreams. The first question
Hoss asks is, during REM sleep, is the brain capable of detecting norm violations or interating
novel reactions experienced in waking life into a larger internal belief system or world
understanding? The answer to this question seems to be: “yes,” given observed activity in brain
regions which allow us to detect when things are wrong and initiate action (Hoss, 2013). The
second question Hoss asks is, can we devise compensating behaviors, or adaptive new behaviors,
and initiate them while in REM sleep? The answer to this question is also “yes.” Active regions
which lead to this conclusion include the anterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, and the
basal ganglia, which are all associated with experimenting with new behaviors and/or initiating
action (Hoss, 2013). Hoss’s third question was quite similar to the last and asked, can the
dreaming brain provide cues to guide and influence action? Once again, the active brain regions
observed suggest that we probably can. In particular, the following regions contribute to this
potential capability: the antieror cingulate, which provides cues to influence and monitor
performance in order to select appropriate responses; the insula, which is involvd in possessing a
sense of self, receiving sudden insight, and guiding perceptual decision-making; the basal
ganglia, which motivates the seeking of long-term as opposed to immediate rewards; the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which monitors learning, provides a “sense of knowing” and aids in
forming judgements of confidence (Hoss, 2013). In particular, the mPFC may be responsible for
the “guiding forces” often experienced in dreams either through an encouraging other or an
internal instinct of what to do next in dream scenarios.
The last two questions Hoss examines center around aspects of emotional learning. The
first is, is the dreaming brain capable of emotional reinforcement of an anticipated outcome? The

23

pattern of “yes”’s continues with this question. The active region of the anterior cingulate is
known to have the function of placing a reward value on expected outcomes in order to facilitate
appropriate responses. The basal ganglia has been shown to be involved in “focused, rewardbased decision-making and learning and adapting to changing conditions” (Hoss, 2013). Finally,
the caudal and ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been associated with expectation
and regulating or planning behavior based on reward and punishment and influencing changes in
behavior through this process (Hoss, 2013). All three of these regions are shown to be active
while we dream. Finally, Hoss examines the question of, is the dreaming brain capable of
learning, emotional dampening, or extinction? The answer to this question turns out to be “yes”
as well. Particularly, the mPFC has been associated with extinction of conditioned fear, which
may explain why we often feel more resolved after confronting deep fears inside our dreams, and
the basal ganglia has been associated by some researchers a sessential to the processes of
extinction learning and making or inhibiting responses. Lastly, the ventral striatum (VST),
another region shown to be active in the dreaming brain, has been associated with inhibitory
control and extinction learning via communication with the prefrontal cortex and OFC (Hoss,
2013).
In summary, neuroscientific evidence contributes a unique marker of indication as to
what sort of internal processes might be causing dreams as well as what type of things we might
be capable of doing while dreaming. On the nature of dreams, we may be able to say three things
with some certainty: one, dreams likely reveal our unconscious world-views; two, dreams are
highly associative events; and three, dreams undeniably depict real emotions, including those we
have either consciously or unconsciously repressed (Hoss, 2013). One theory not mentioned
above is that the emotional content of dreams may actually dictate the dream images we see,
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contrary to the popular notion that our emotions are reactions to what we see in dreams (Hoss,
2013). This belief lends itself well ot the idea of dreamwork which will be discussed in the next
section. Another major conclusion from the neurological events of dreaming is that the many
forms of learning theories, such as threat simulation theory, costly signaling theory, and even
Jung’s compensatory integration theory, are directly supported by neurological evidence. Due to
the virtual non-existence of contrary evidence to theories of learning, they very well may
constitute the most tenable dream theories which have been proposed within the psychological
study of dreams.
Could Dreams Not Have an Adaptive Function?
Despite the significantly personal and emotional nature of dreams, not all researchers
believe dreams possess an adaptive function. This belief arises from two distinct perspectives on
examining dream phenomenology: evolutionary and neurological. While Ribeiro (2004)
concluded that we use dreams to simulate threats and learn survival skills, other researchers who
have taken the evolutionary approach to dreams remain less convinced of a special functionality
within dreams. Domhoff (2009) is one researcher who presents such a view. In a paper proposing
a neurocognitive theory of dreams, Domhoff briefly explores the evolutionary history of
dreaming, much like Ribeiro (2004) and McNamara and Butler (2009). At the end of this
exploration, however, Domhoff concludes the following:
[Dreams are a by-product of] two great evolutionary developments, sleeping and
thinking. Even more specifically, they are a by-product of two specific cognitive abilities
that have great adaptive value in the waking world, the ability to generate mental imagery
and the ability to generate narratives. They occur, as already noted, when there is
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sufficient brain activation in a context where there is little or no guidance for the brain
from external stimuli or the self system. (Domhoff, 2009).
In this description, Domhoff seems to portray dreams as an unintentional by-prodcut of other
evolutionary functions, namely thinking and sleeping.
The evolutionary considerations proposed by McNamara and Butler (2009) can also be
interpreted as supporting this view. To briefly recall some aspects of Ribeiro’s findings, Ribeiro
(2004) found that the development of REM sleep seems to have coincided with the development
of increased intelligence; in the developmental track of REM sleep, which begins with reptiles,
then moves to birds, to land mammals, and eventually to humans, each new species seems to
have increased capacity for planning, complex strategic instincts, or thought. REM sleep was
furthermore thought to have evolved along this track in order to enable a deeper, more complex
memory consolidation process, which would ultimately create adaptive behaviors or enable
learning which is based on a more complex integration of various types of information than less
deep versions of sleep are capable of providing (Ribeiro, 2004). One of the difficult questions
from this point becomes differentiating the role of REM sleep from possible roles of dreaming as
a phenomenon which is distinct from the REM sleep which underlies it. One way to tackle this
conundrum is to ask, what might be the function of animal dreams, if they have them? Brain
imaging of animals during REM sleep shows animals’ brain activity during sleep to be highly
similar to the brain activity seen in human sleep (Domhoff, 2009). One key phenomenon which
characterizes animal sleep and is also seen within human sleep is memory reactivation
(Wamsley, 2014). In a study on rat dreams, researchers trained a rat to navigate a novel maze,
then observed its brain activity during a subsequent period of sleep. Astonishingly, researchers
found that the same regions activated during the navigation of the maze were reactivated
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numerous times during sleep (Wamsley, 2014). From this, it would seem that perhaps animals do
in fact “dream.” It furthermore seems that the function of such dreams may in fact be some form
of threat simulation theory or other learning theory.
But is there another function to dreaming besides purely threat simulation? Or more
precicesley, why is it necessary for us to be consciously aware of this mental process when other
periods of sleep clearly demonstrate that we could simply maintain a highly reduced level of
consciousness? One might say that humans’ ability to experience their dreams is merely a
consequence of the fact that we are conscious beings. As Wamsley (2014) points out, “beyond
this, a “function” for dreaming additionally hinges on the difficult question of whether conscious
experience in general serves any function” (Wamsley, 2014). So perhaps the best answer to this
question is the question, does consciousness have a function? Of course, this question has been
asked by human kind for millennia, and to this day, despite the tools of modern psychological
study we possess, neither philosophers nor psychologists have reached any consensus on this
topic (Wamsley, 2014; Baars, 1997; Oizumi, 2014; Hobson, 2009; Dresler et al., 2012; Tononi,
G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C., 2016). While no one theory will probably perfectly
describe the true “biological purpose” of conscious awareness, most theorists would likely agree
on at least the idea that consciousness allows us to better understand and respond to that
environment using inborn instincts as well as rational cognition. Therefore, perhaps one reason
we are conscious of our dreams is that we are meant to ponder their subjective meaning using
our instincts and reasoning capabilities, just as the purpose of consciousness in waking life is
perhaps to better understand and respond to our external environment.
Wamsley and Stickgold (2010) point out a more neurological account which leads them
to another unclear or non-existent objective functionality of dreaming. This explanation relies on
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the recent discovery of a network of brain regions which researchers call the “default network”
(Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010). The default network refers to a group of brain regions which are
consistently active across different brain states. The precise amount of activity which the default
network exhibits does change, however, depending on one’s brain state and level of arousal
(Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010). The major regions which constitute the default network are the
medial temporal, medial prefrontal, midline, and parietal regions (Buckner, R. L., AndrewsHanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L., 2008). The state of default network activity which is of
particular interest is the state of “resting wakefulness,” during which default network activity
strongly overlaps with activity observed during REM sleep. The characteristic of the resting
wakefulness state which makes it relevant to the study of dreams is that during resting
wakefulness, default network activity increases just as sensory input decreases. Some examples
of a resting wakefulness state is the feeling of respite we experience when resting on the train
after a long day at work, or closing one’s eyes and relaxing in the tranquility of one’s living
room after a stressful day (Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010). These conditions cause an increase in
default network activity. Buckner and colleagues (2008) have theorized that one purpose of the
default network might be some form of memory consolidation. Interestingly, a study on the
thoughts we produce during resting wakefulness reveals that they are highly similar to those we
experience when we initially start to fall asleep and experience non-REM dreams (Wamsley &
Stickgold, 2010). During both instances, we are likely to experience rehearsal of recently
experienced memories which give rise to daydream-like muses that are fanciful while not quite
reaching the level of free association or intense surrealism experienced during REM-associated
dreams (Wamsley & Stickgold, 2010; Buckner et al., 2008).
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This interesting similarity between resting wakefulness and the dream state in both brain
activity and reported mentation gives rise to a unique theory of dream function. This “default
network theory” is unique in that it identifies dreams as an inevitable consequence of automatic
memory consolidation processes that occur during periods of reduced sensory input.
Furthermore, this automatic process is not limited to occurring during sleep and instead
frequently occurs during wakefulness just as well as sleep. A major conclusion Wamsley and
Stickgold (2010) draw from this unique perspective is that the conscious experience of dreaming
may not serve a unique function separate from the automatic process of memory consolidation.
In a separate article, Wamsley (2014) admits that the activity of the default network does not
perfectly overlap with the neural substrate of dreaming, and this difference may indicate that
dreams do serve some other purpose. However, the preponderance of evidence regarding brain
activity during sleep as well as the comparison of this activity to the activity seen during resting
wakefulness suggest that a relatively large portion of neurological dream phenomenology is in
fact already known within the scientific community. Therefore, even with the potential for new
discoveries in the future, the current analysis of dream functionality, including the theories
regarding its lack of functionality, may likely capture a fair portion of the true functional purpose
of dreams.

How Should We Interpret our Dreams?
Historical records indicate that dream interpretation is a practice which has existed for
thousands of years. Civilizations dating as far back as 1350 b.c.e. have produced written records
which explain the meaning of dreams, often through the lens of religion and spirituality (Crisp,
n.d.). While modern society has largely abandoned the cultural and spiritual aspects of dream
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interpretation, some psychologists have embarked on the quest to form scientifically valid
methods of dream interpretation (Hill and Rochlen, 1999; Keleman, 2007; Mahrer, 2009). Even
casual conversations can be seen as attempts to practice dream interpretation, albeit in a much
less structured way. In honor of providing a reliable framework for the pursuit of interpreting
one’s dreams, the current paper presents an overview and empirical analysis of one of the most
well-known methods of modern dream interpretation.
Hill and Rochlen’s Cognitive-Experiential Model
Developed by psychologists Hill and Rochlen who published their findings in 1999, the
method in question is known as the cognitive-experiential model of dream interpretation. In
creating a model of dream work, the two researchers wanted to design a model that was as
simple and teachable as possible. The researchers also went to great lengths to empirically test
their model through testing sessions with real patients in psychotherapy sessions (although the
model can be used by an individual with no outside help). The model itself is comprised of three
parts - exploration, insight, and action - and is based on two key assumptions. The first
assumption the model makes is that dreams often represent important life experiences, conflicts,
and unresolved issues, and because of this, they are personally meaningful and thus deserving of
reflection. The second assumption is that dream imagery and content is of an entirely personal
nature, and that because of this fact, the dreamer’s own interpretation, as opposed to others’ input
on how to interpret images within the dream, is of the utmost importance to the process of dream
work.
Goals of the Three Stages
The first part of the process is known as the exploration phase. The exploration phase is
comprised of re-entering the dream, or “bringing it back to life,” and has two goals. The first
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goal is that in re-entering the dream, Hill and Rochlen hope the dreamer will become more open
to learning from the dream. Second, in a similar way, re-entering the dream helps to kick-start
the process of associating the images in the dream with aspects of the dreamer’s waking life. The
second phase is called insight. The goal of this phase is to try and figure out what the dream
means. Naturally, this phase is where the meat of the interpretation process occurs and where
individuals embarking on the process alone are most likely to have their possibilities limited by
lack of external input. Finally, the action phase attempts to turn the meaning derived from the
dream into executable actions the dreamer can take to improve his or her life.
Applying the Three Stages
Assuming the dreamer is accompanied by a partner, to begin the first phase of
exploration, the partner should ask the dreamer to retell their dream in the first-person present.
This will help the dreamer re-experience the emotions of the dream as well as recall more details
about the dream. Next, the dreamer should choose roughly four to seven images that they wish to
explore in a four-part process: description, re-experiencing, associations, and waking-life
triggers.
After the dreamer has explored the chosen images, they should then be asked what they
believe the greater meaning of the dream is. In this process, dreamers will usually tend toward
five common methods of interpretation: the experiential level, which entails what it feels like to
do or experience the dream images, the waking-life level, which examines how the dream images
relate to waking life activities and thoughts, the parts-of-self level, which considers how different
dream images relate to different aspects of the dreamer’s personal identity, childhood conflicts
level, which relates dream imagery to early childhood struggles and traumas, and finally the
spiritual-existential level, which examines how the events in the dream relate to the dreamer’s
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beliefs about the meaning of life or the dreamer’s relationship with a higher power. Due to the
individual tendency to gravitate more naturally toward one of these levels of interpretation than
the others, this phase is where a guide or partner can be most helpful in prodding the dreamer to
consider different points of view (Hill and Rochlen, 1999).
Lastly, once the dreamer has attained a satisfactory interpretation of the greater meanings
within the dream, the dreamer should decide how they would like to change their waking life
through taking specific courses of action. Often, when the dreamer finds a satisfying meaning in
the dream, the action stage comes naturally with very little prodding by a partner. However, if
the dreamer seems unsure of how to change their waking behavior, their partner can prod the
dreamer by first asking the dreamer what they might like to change about the dream, then how
this desire for change relates to a desire to change some aspect of their waking life in a similar
way. An example Hill and Rochlen provide for this scenario, is in a dream where an elevator
won’t stop going up and down, the dreamer comments that they would like to stop the elevator
from going up and down. Their partner might then ask, what else in your life do you want to stop
from going up and down? While life-changing action is often natural, as mentioned, unsure
dreamers may like to further consider the types of actions they can take, of which there are two.
First, they can think about behavioral changes, which constitutes taking specific actions such as
ending a relationship or quitting a job. If these actions seem difficult or implausible, these deep
issues might be best tackled through collaboration with a behavioral therapist. The second type
of action one can commit to taking is creating a ritual, such as hanging a meaningful picture or
burning an object, which somehow honors the meaning the dreamer derived from the dream (Hill
and Rochlen, 1999).
Empirical Support for the Model
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A fair amount of empirical evidence suggests that Hill and Rochlen’s model is effective.
In a review by Hill and Knox (2010), researchers assessed both the model’s outcomes and the
theoretical basis of its process. Hill and Knox assessed outcomes of the model by examining
three elements of its usage in therapy sessions; the perceived quality of the session, achievement
of the dreamer’s goals in pursuing dream work, and broader indirect outcomes of doing dream
work with the model. In results from twelve studies, clients overall perceived therapy sessions
which used the cognitive experiential model as higher quality than sessions in which no dream
work occurred (Hill and Knox, 2010). With regard to dreamers’ goals, a longitudinal 2-week
study suggests that clients felt “increased functioning on their target problems [2 weeks] after a
dream session” (Hill and Knox, 2010). Other studies show that the insight and action phases are
particularly useful in working on these issues and providing greater clarity about them (Hill and
Knox, 2010). In terms of broader impacts of the model, evidence is less convincing that the
model has substantive effects on tangential or indirectly related aspects of their lives, such as
quality or state of relationships (Hill and Knox, 2010). As for the process, the most telling
evidence lies in dreamer testimony of the process’ elements. In this regard, clients generally do
feel that each element of the process is beneficial to the overall process, especially the insight
and action phases, as mentioned above. In particular, the insight phase was considered helpful in
gaining insight and making links to waking life through its explanation of different methods of
interpreting meaning from dream images, which helped in perceiving new meaning (Hill and
Knox, 2010).
Given this empirical evidence, the cognitive-experiential model of dream interpretation
is perhaps deserving of individual experimentation. For those who may try the method and feel
dissatisfied or are otherwise curious in exploring other methods of modern dream interpretation,
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I would suggest two other methods: the formative method, which focuses on the bodily and
muscular elements of dream activity, which has been proposed by Stanley Keleman (2007), and
the unnamed method which I call “becoming a whole new person,” which is proposed by Alvin
Mahrer (2009).
Conclusion
The mystery of the function of dreams and the question of how to accurately interpret
them has been pondered by mankind for thousands of years. In summation of the findings
discussed in the present paper, there still exists a lack of general consensus on the answer to
these questions. However, neurological advances of modern times have shed some light on what
might potentially cause dreams to form, as well as what types of theories might be plausible
explanations of dream function. Particularly, dreams seem to be caused in part by some
neurologically identifiable processes of memory consolidation. More specifically, activation of
certain regions of the brain during sleep have led some to conclude that dreams may portray
simulations based on real life from which we can learn new adaptive behaviors. In the end, the
various theories of learning seem to be somewhat heavily supported by this neurological
evidence. Our apparent capability to learn from dreams combined with the extensive findings of
memory-related phenomena occurring during the dream state seems to lend psychologicallyoriented compensatory theory of Jung some credence. Perhaps we are in fact “learning” about
our own misconceptions in dreams and “maintaining the self” by using this information to
develop new, more helpful beliefs about our external world.
Finally, while dream interpretation remains a nascent area of study at best, burgeoning
research suggests that some models, such as Hill and Rochlen’s cognitive-experiential model,
may be helpful to those who wish to explore their dreams in more depth.
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Appendix
Figure 1

Relatively active (white) and *inactive (dark gray) centers of the brain in REM sleep (Hoss,
2013).
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